Appendix B Literature Review: Information Aggregation Mechanisms

Information aggregation mechanisms
Evidence and implications
How does information aggregation on Wikipedia differ from previous mechanisms?
Combining analyst forecasts
• Financial analysts as the foremost source of quantified information for investors (Abarbanell et al. 1995; Francis et al. 1997; Healy and Palepu 2001; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Roulstone 2003; Skinner 1994 Skinner , 1997 ).
• Analyst forecasts, on average, are subject to upward bias (Francis et al. 1997; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Roulstone 2003) .
Wikipedia provides detailed qualitative information about firm operations, and information aggregation on Wikipedia retains information of neutral-point-ofview. This is different than analyst forecasts which are often subject to an upward bias.
A unified depository to store news and discussions (e.g., online message boards)
• Antweiler and Frank (2004) examined 1.5 million messages posted on online stock message boards. Collectively online messages affect trading activities in the market, suggesting that online messages provide information to investors.
• Investors, however, may bear high costs of processing the large volume of information, i.e., the huge number of online messages (Gu et al. 2007 ).
Wikipedia contributors modify the same entry about a company, through which they aggregate information. Users, therefore, use a synthesized set of information, so they do not bear high costs of processing information.
Collective reporting by community participants • Gu et al. (2007) examined 500,000 postings from three virtual investing-related communities (VICs). They showed that investors value highquality postings.
• "One approach VIC providers use to improve posting quality is to actively monitor and filter low-quality postings…allowing users to report abusive postings, which are then investigated manually by VIC providers" (Gu et al. 2007, p. 74) .
Wikipedia removes noise in a decentralized way (i.e., by individual contributors). Also, information aggregation on Wikipedia involves, but not limited to, user screening to remove noise.
Corporate website • Geerings et al. (2003) examined the "investor relations" webpage of 50 large companies.
• On the corporate webpage of investor relations, "information available through other sources is combined to better inform investors" (Geerings et al. 2003 p. 567) .
Wikipedia is a typical example of "wisdom of crowds" which is in sharp contrast to the "investor relations" section on corporate website, where companies select what information to present. 
Appendix C
Appendix D Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation
We examine the possible endogeneity of Wikipedia modifications. First, managers may release information through Wikipedia themselves. If a manager decides to release information through Wikipedia, and if the decision to edit the entry correlates with the decision about disclosure lag (for example, because of an incentive to release information to the public), then the manager's self-editing may confound social media's effect. Second, if there exists an alternative information channel that influences both Wikipedia modifications and disclosure lags, then the identified effect cannot be attributed to Wikipedia. We employ two instrument variables for the possibly endogeneous variable WikiMOD.
We first consider WikiMOD from the previous quarter. It is correlated with WikiMOD of the current quarter because contributors' efforts spent on a firm's entry in a quarter are related to those in previous quarters. Since LAG is a variable contingent on a firm's quarterly performance, it is unlikely related to any modifications of the Wikipedia entry before the focal fiscal quarter.
We can also consider an alternative instrument as follows: For a firm's modifications in one quarter, we first identify the contributors. Then, we count the number of modifications that these contributors made on Wikipedia, but on different topics (i.e., entries other than companies). This instrument is correlated with WikiMOD because they both represent the degree to which the contributors add content to Wikipedia. This instrument is unlikely to be related to LAG because the instrument is about modifications on entries other than companies. Therefore, it is unlikely related to LAG.
In sum, the two instruments satisfy the two conditions for valid IV (i.e., correlated with the possibly endogenous variable while uncorrelated with regression residuals). In the below table, we follow Terza e al. (2008) and implement IV analysis using the software package R and the function coxph. We obtain results for WikiMOD that are highly consistent with results from our main analysis (Table 3) . Hence, this IV approach gives us confidence that our main results are not due to alternative explanations. 
Appendix E Regressions Controlling for Firm Visibility Based on (1) Firm Characteristics and (2) Google Search Volume Index (SVI)
In this appendix we report how our results remain unchanged after controlling for firm visibility as we discuss in the "Additional Analysis" subsection of the "Results." Column (1) in the following table replicates the estimates we obtain in Column (5) of Table 3 . In Column (2), we add common controls for firm visibility based on firm characteristics that we identify from the literature. Column (3) further considers Google search volume index (SVI). The regression specification is based on model (1) Note: Robust estimates of standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are one-tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The pseudo R 2 refers to Nagelkerke's (1991) R 2 .
Appendix F Economic Significance of WikiMOD
We conduct an additional analysis to evaluate the economic significance of WikiMOD. The analysis is based on column (2) of Table 4 . We estimate separate regressions by conditioning WikiMOD at its LOW, MEAN, and HIGH levels, defined as the sample mean minus one standard deviation, the sample mean, and the sample mean plus one standard deviation, respectively. For instance, when we subtract the LOW level from WikiMOD, the estimated coefficient on BIAS represents its effect expected at the LOW level of WikiMOD (Aiken and West 1991) . As reported in column (1) of the table below, the coefficient on BIAS is -0.0062. We multiply the coefficient by one standard deviation of BIAS (3.0376), and the result (-1.88%) indicates the market reaction induced by an increasing BIAS (increase by one standard deviation). The market reaction becomes -0.73% in column (2) when WikiMOD is at the MEAN level, and it becomes statistically nonsignificant in column (3) when WikiMOD is at the HIGH level. A comparison of columns (1) and (2) shows that, when WikiMOD moves from the LOW to MEAN level, this increase in information aggregation is associated with a change in market reaction by 1.15% (=(-0.73%) -(-1.88%)). This indicates an economically meaningful impact of information aggregation. Note: The LOW, MEAN, and HIGH levels of WikiMOD are equal to sample mean minus one standard deviation, sample mean, and sample mean plus one standard deviation, respectively. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; N.S. = nonsignificant.
Additional Analysis on Market Reaction
Appendix G Robustness to Samples and Measures
Several additional tests show that our results are robust to alternative samples and measures. We present the regression results in the following two tables, one for management disclosure lag and the other for investor reaction.
In each of the two tables, for convenience, column (1) shows our base model as presented in text. In column (2), we sort all observations by the number of analysts' forecasts for EPS, and we keep only observations between the 5 th and 95 th percentiles. Because BIAS and DISPERSION are computed based on analyst forecasts, using this subsample helps remove extreme cases.
Columns (3) and (4) examine the extent to which edit wars may affect our result. Since Wikipedia is an open platform and anyone is allowed to post and modify entries, some entries can be very contentious. It is necessary to make sure that our results are not driven by the edit wars. Our first check (reported in Column 3) is based on the "revert" activities. For each modification j by user i, m ij , on Wikipedia, we search for a future (within a month) edit, m kj , by user k that reverts the contribution. Then we search again (within a month from the revert) for i's further revert of k's modification. When we find such patterns we remove the second and third modifications. If we find additional reverts in the same war (i.e., within one month k reverts i's work again), we also remove these additional modifications. The result of this check is a new data set that contains fewer modifications in each quarter with all "back and forth" edits removed. Our second check (reported in Column 4) adopts a more aggressive approach. In this check, we only consider the first contribution by each contributor in each financial period. With this approach, we not only eliminate all future edit wars between this user and others, but also remove additional edits by the same user. The first check yields highly significant effect of WikMOD, and the second also gives significant effect, though relatively weaker (because it is an aggressive approach). Overall, our results regarding information aggregation over Wikipedia remain qualitatively unchanged.
Column (5) uses the number of words added, instead of the number of times an entry is modified, to proxy for information aggregation on Wikipedia. Column (6) measures NEWS by the total number of words in all news stories, instead of the total number of news stories, about a firm. Column (7) deflates BIAS and DISPERSION by stock price (Francis e al. 1997) . These two tables demonstrate qualitatively the same results for our hypothesis testing. Note: Robust estimates of standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are one-tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
